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ARTICLES

A LOOK AT AMERICAN LEGAL PRACTICE
THROUGH A PERSPECTIVE OF JEWISH LAW,
ETHICS, AND TRADITION: A
CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW
SAMUEL

J.

LEVINE*

INTRODUCTION

A discussion of American legal practice through a perspective of Jewish law, ethics, and tradition may be considered under
at least two distinct but interrelated approaches. A historical
approach might look to attitudes toward lawyers found in sources
relating to courts that have functioned under the Jewish legal
system. However, as Part I of this Essay briefly explains, because
Jewish courts classically operated under an inquisitorial system of
justice, relatively few primary sources of Jewish law include material addressing the role of lawyers. Accordingly, references to
lawyers in Jewish law and tradition may remain of little relevance
to the practice of law in the contemporary United States, as any
normative conclusions derived from these sources likely depend
upon underlying assumptions inapplicable to the American
adversary legal system.
Thus, as Part II of the Essay suggests, an alternative
approach might instead focus more generally upon areas of Jewish law and ethics that, although perhaps not always directly
related to the substance of legal practice, may in fact offer a
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.
L.L.M., Columbia University; J.D., Fordham University; Rabbinical Ordination,
Yeshiva University; B.A., Yeshiva University.
An earlier version of this Article was presented as part of a program at the
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Traditions," was co-sponsored by the A.A.L.S. Section on Professional Responsibility and the A.A.L.S. Section on Law and Religion, and was organized by
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more accurate indication of the attitudes of Jewish tradition
toward the work of American lawyers. Toward that end, Part II
presents a three-tiered conceptual framework suitable for an
analysis of the implications for Jewish law and ethics of a broad
range of human activities, including various aspects of the practice of law. Finally, branching out from Jewish tradition, the
Essay concludes with a broader reference to the effectiveness of
the religious lawyering movement in providing a means for
improving exploration of and attitudes toward the work and ethics of lawyers.
I.

ABSENCE OF THE LAWYER IN THE TRADITIONAL JEWISH

LEGAL SYSTEM

As a historical matter, primary sources of Jewish law and tradition, which include extensive material relating to nearly every
aspect of life and law,1 remain largely bereft of discussions relating to the role of lawyers. The absence of such information
reflects the nature of the Jewish legal system, which classically
functioned under an inquisitorial model of court proceedings,
rather than employing the kind of adversarial model central to
the American legal system.2 Thus, in place of the expectation
that lawyers will formulate, advocate, and challenge legal claims
and strategies, the Jewish legal system relied upon the parties to
state their claims and upon judges to insure fairness through
active participation in all stages of the trial, including questioning parties and witnesses, before adjudicating the matter.'
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Talmud instructs against
engaging in the conduct of orkhe ha-dayanim, apparently referencing behavior typical of lawyers who provide strategic assistance to
their clients.4 Although on its face the Talmudic principle seems
to suggest a negative impression of the work of lawyers, the
admonition likely addresses judges, who had to take great care
not to allow their inquisitorial role to border upon perceived or
actual favoritism toward one of the parties.5 Similarly, to the
1. See, e.g.,
1 ARYEH KAPLAN, THE HANDBOOK OF JEWISH THOUGHT 78
(1979) (noting "the multitude of laws governing even such mundane acts as
eating, drinking, dressing and business .. .").
2.

See, e.g., MICHAEL J. BROYDE, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE AND JEWISH LAW:

HALAKHIc PERSPECTIVES ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 11-12 (1996); Dov I. Frimer,
The Role of the Lawyer in Jewish Law, 1 J. L. & RELIGION 297, 297-301 (1983).
3. BROYDE, supra note 2, at 11-12; Frimer, supra note 2, at 297-301.
4. THE TALMUD, Aboth 1:8 (I. Epstein, ed. & trans., Soncino Press 1935)
[herinafter TALMUD, Aboth 1:8].
5. See BROYDE, supra note 2, at 12-14; BASIL F. HERRING, JEWISH ETHICS
AND HALAKHAH FOR OUR TIME: SOURCES AND COMMENTARY 99, 117 n.1 (1984).
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extent that the Talmud's instruction to judges incorporates an
implicit critique of the practices of lawyers, such criticism is
arguably directed at either outright dishonesty or forms of advo6
cacy intended to subvert the proper role of the judges.
Although over time there has developed within courts of Jewish
law a form of legal representation, the parameters of legal advocacy are likewise limited so as not to interfere with the traditional
judicial function.7 Thus, in light of the systemic differences
between the Jewish legal model and the American legal model,
reliance on the historical record of lawyers within the Jewish
legal system likely proves tenuous at best for the purposes of
ascertaining attitudes in Jewish law and tradition toward the work
of contemporary American lawyers.'
II.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In the apparent absence of a direct analogue in Jewish legal
tradition corresponding to the American practice of law, a more
helpful mode of analysis might instead consider attitudes in JewSee also MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Laws of Sanhedrin 21:11; BACHYA BEN
ASHER, COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH 239 (Chaim Dov Chavel ed., 1991) (expli-

cating Leviticus 23:2).
6. See BROYDE, supra note 2, at 21-22. But see Mordecai Biser, Can an
ObservantJew Practice Law? A Look at Some Halakhic Problems, 11 JEWISH L. ANN.
101, 131-32 (1994) (arguing that those engaged in the conduct of orkhe hadayanim are "criticized not only for seeking to pervert the [Jewish legal] inquisitorial system by introducing elements of advocacy, but because engaging in
legal legerdemain is itself regarded as unethical.").
7. See, e.g., BROYDE, supranote 2, at 19-23; Frimer, supra note 2, at 301-02;
HERRING, supra note 5, at 116-17.
8. Notably, although the Jewish legal system relies upon an inquisitorial
model rather than an adversarial model, Jewish tradition accepts the general
proposition that, when conducted with pure motives, an adversarial process will
prove valuable in achieving a proper resolution of a legal issue. See, e.g., TALMUD,

Avoth 5:20; TALMUD BAVLI, Kiddushin 30b. Indeed, to some extent the

Jewish legal system incorporates an adversarial dynamic, illustrated in one of
the methods for composing a Jewish court of three judges. Specifically, each
party first selects a judge to serve on the court, and together the two judges
then select a third judge. Although judges are prohibited from favoring either
party, the process is intended to insure that the position of each party will be
fully and adequately presented and considered. See BROYDE, supra note 2, at
13-14; Frimer, supra note 2, at 299.
Conversely, there have long existed discussions and debates among American legal scholars regarding the ethics and effectiveness of a system incorporating advocacy and adversary justice. For extensive consideration of these issues,
see, for example, MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWvRS' ETHICS 13-43 (3d ed. 2004); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 315-31 (7th ed. 2005); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 563-92 (1986).
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ish law and ethics toward conduct typical of American lawyers.
As scholars of Jewish law have emphasized, Jewish thought aims
to elevate all realms of human endeavor through ethical conduct
in every area of life.9 In the words of Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik,
"[t]he true sanctuary is the sphere of our daily, mundane activities, for it is there that the realization of [Jewish law] takes
place."10 Thus, an analysis of the work of lawyers through a perspective of Jewish tradition would require conceptual consideration of the ethics of specific aspects of legal practice, rather than
viewing the practice of law as a parochial form of activity, subject
only to its own unique rules of morality and consequently
immune from others. 1 Indeed, a number of American legal ethics scholars have similarly aimed to dispel the notion that the
status of legal practice as a "profession" entitles lawyers to inherent claims of virtue and morality. Instead, these scholars have
emphasized, the practice of law, like other areas of human
endeavor, has the potential for virtue or for vice, depending on
the manner in which it is performed.1 2
9. See, e.g., KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 78 (stating that the commandments
"penetrate every nook and cranny of a person's existence, hallowing even the
lowliest acts and elevating them to a service to God.... sanctify every facet of
life, and constantly remind one of [one's] responsibilities toward God."). See
also Samuel J. Levine, The Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer: IntegratingSpirituality,

Scholarship and Profession,27 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1199 (1996) [hereinafter Levine,
Broad Life]; Samuel J. Levine, Reflections on the Practice of Law as a Religious Calling, From a Perspective of Jewish Law and Ethics, 32 PEPP. L. REv. 411, 411-13 &
nn.1-10 (2005) [hereinafter Levine, Practice of Law as a Religious Calling].
10. JOsEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAFHIC MAN 94-95 (Lawrence Kaplan
trans., 1983) (originally published in Hebrew as ISH HA-HALAK-AH, in 1 TAL'IOT
3-4 (1944)); see also CHAIM YAAKov GOLDVICHT, ARBA'A MA'AMRIM B'AGGADA
21-31 (1984); BACHYA BEN ASHER, Kad Ha-kemach, in KisvEi RABBENU BACHYA
350-54 (Chaim Dov Chavel ed., 1995).
11. On some level, then, a fitting response to the question of the attitude
of Jewish law and tradition toward the practice of law might resemble Judge
Easterbrook's response to the question of the law of property in cyberspace. See
Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
207. Judge Easterbrook posited that "the best way to learn the law applicable to
specialized endeavors is to study general rules." Id. at 207. Thus, he argued, in
assessing the law of "Property in Cyberspace," the most effective approach
would be to "[d]evelop a sound law of intellectual property, then apply it to
computer networks." Id. at 208 (emphasis in original). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HAgv. J.L. & PUB. POL'V 108 (1990).
Likewise, the most helpful approach to the question of legal practice in Jewish
law and tradition might entail the identification of general laws regarding
proper and ethical conduct, which are then applied to conduct involved in the
practice of law.

12. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran,Jr., Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its
Death, Attempts at Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of Virtue, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'V 305 (2000); David Luban, Asking the Right Questions, 72
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Accordingly, an effective conceptual analogue in Jewish tradition for a consideration of American legal practice may be
found in a broadly applicable three-tiered approach, one that is
similarly helpful in an analysis of the decidedly mundane-and
ostensibly unrelated-activity of eating." On one level, Jewish
law includes technical legal precepts, in the form of both positive
and negative commandments, regarding what food may' 4-and,
at times, should" 5-be eaten, the way food should be prepared,1 6
and rituals surrounding a meal. 7 More broadly, Jewish law and
ethics address the manner in which individuals are instructed to
use their resources, including, for example, their willingness to
share their food with those who are needy.'" Finally, Jewish
thought teaches the possibility of elevating the act of eating
through the incorporation into a meal of otherwise incidental
virtuous conduct, such as the study of Torah, through which participants may be considered, as it were, to be eating at the "table
of God."' 9 In turn, each of these categories may be applicable in
an analytical framework considering the practice of law in terms
of technical aspects of legal practice, broader aspects of legal
L. REV.839 (1999); Russell G. Pearce, Law Day 2050: Post-Professionalism,
Moral Leadership, and the Law-as-Business Paradigm, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 9

TEMPLE

(1999); Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism ParadigmShift: Why DiscardingProfessional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1229 (1995) [hereinafter Pearce, The ProfessionalParadigm Shift]; PatrickJ.
Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy,
and UnethicalProfession, 52 VAND. L. REv. 871 (1999); Thomas L. Shaffer, Inaugural Howard Lichtenstein Lecture in Legal Ethics: Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral
Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 393 (1990-1991); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Lost Lawyer: FailingIdeals of the Legal Profession, 41 Loy. L. REv. 387 (1995) (book review);
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. Q.
1 (1975). See also Samuel J. Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism:Believers and
Heretics, 61 MD.L. REv. 217 (2002) [hereinafter Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism]; Samuel J. Levine, Professionalism Without Parochialism:Julius Henry Cohen,
Rabbi Nachman of Breslov, and the Stories of Two Sons, 71 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1339
(2003); Samuel J. Levine, RediscoveringJulius Henry Cohen and the Origins of the
Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse of Early Twentieth Century
Legal Professionalism, 47 Am.J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (2005).
13. See HERSHEL SCHACHTER, ERETZ HATZEVI: BE'UREI SUGYOT 286 (1992);
see also MORDECHAm I. WILLIG, AM MORDECHAI ON TRACTATE BERAKHOT 13-14

(1992); BACHYA BEN ASHER, Shulchan Shel Arba, in KIsVEI RABBENU BACHYA, supra
note 10, at 453.
14. See, e.g.,
MAIMONIDES, supra note 5, Laws of ForbiddenFoods.
15. See, e.g., id., Laws of Chametz U'Matza, ch. 6.
16. See, e.g., id., Laws of Shechita.
17. See, e.g.,
id., Laws of Blessings.
18. See SCHACHTER, supra note 13, at 286 (citing TALMUD BAvLi, Berachoth
55a; MAIMONIDES, supra note 5, Laws of Yom Tov 6:18).
19. TALMUD, Aboth 3:3.
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practice, including utilization of resources and abilities, and conduct incidental to the practice of law.
A.

Technical Aspects of Legal Practice

Various technical aspects of the practice of law have potentially significant implications in the context ofJewish law and ethics, raising complex challenges to observance of a number of
religious obligations. Concerns over these challenges have led
some commentators to conclude that engaging in many areas of
American legal practice may entail the express violation ofJewish
law. z° Perhaps the most common issue of concern relates to the
Talmudic directive prohibiting Jewish parties from litigating a
dispute in a non-rabbinic court.2" By extension, a Jewish lawyer
who represents a party in such litigation may violate a secondary
prohibition against assisting others in committing a wrongdoing.2 2 Although both of these prohibitions are subject to a number of exceptions and qualifications,2" there remains a plausible
argument that in adherence to these principles of Jewish law an
attorney practicing in the United States may be obligated, at
times, to decline clients, or potentially even to decline positions
24
of employment.
Similarly, a variety of business transactions have the potential of violating Biblical and rabbinic prohibitions, including, for
20. See Biser, supra note 6 passim; see also Israel Greisman, The Jewish Criminal Lawyer's Dilemma, 29 FORDHAM UB. L.J. 2413, 2419 (2002); Steven H.
Resnicoff, A Jewish Look at Lawyering Ethics-A Preliminary Essay, 15 ToURo L.
REv. 73 (1998). But see BROYDE, supra note 2 passim; MichaelJ. Broyde, On the
Practice of Law According to Halacha, 20 J. HALACHA AND CONTEMP. Soc'y 5
(1990); MichaelJ. Broyde, PracticingCriminalLaw: A Jewish Law Analysis of Being
a Prosecutoror Defense Attorney, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1141 (1998).
21. See TALMUD BAVLI, Gittin 88b; see also BROYDE, supra note 2, at 41-48,
67-72; Biser, supranote 6, at 103-07; Simcha Krauss, Litigationin Secular Courts,
2J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. Soc'Y 35 (1982).
22. See Leviticus 19:14. See also Biser, supra note 6, at 108-12; Steven H.
Resnicoff, Helping a Client ViolateJewish Law: A Jewish Lawyer's Dilemma, in JEWISH
LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES X 191 (H.G. Sprecher ed., 2000). In fact, according
to at least one commentator, the lawyer in such circumstances acts in violation
of the primary prohibition against litigating in non-rabbinic courts. See
MENASHEH KLEIN, MISHNE HALAKHOT 7:255, 3:214, cited in BROYDE, supranote 2,
at 50. For a response to this position, see BROYDE, supra note 2, at 50-52.
23. See BROYDE, supra note 2, at 53-66; see also Biser, supra note 6, at 112;
Resnicoff, supra note 20, at 88-92.
24. See Biser, supra note 6, at 112-16; Dov Bressler, Arbitration and the
Courts in Jewish Law, 9 J. HALAcHA & CONTEMP. Soc'v 105, 109-10 (1985);
Resnicoff, supra note 20, at 83-96. But see BROYDE, supra note 2, at 53-66.

2006]

AMERICAN LEGAL PRACTICE AND JEWISH LAW

example, charging or paying interest. 25 Although methods have
been formulated in Jewish law for structuring many transactions
to comply with the restrictions on interest, 26 the details of these
methods are notoriously complex and the requirements often
challenging in practice. 27 Accordingly, to the extent that a particular transaction fails adequately to comply with these requirements and thus violates prohibitions on interest, a lawyer who
facilitates such a transaction may thereby be in breach of the secondary prohibition against enabling wrongdoing. 28 In addition,
because of the unique nature of the Biblical command regarding
interest, the lawyer may concomitantly violate the primary substantive prohibition
against active participation in a transaction
29
involving interest.
The work of a criminal lawyer represents yet another area in
which commentators have considered potential conflicts between
professional responsibilities of the practice of law and religious
obligations under Jewish law. In analyzing the work of a prosecutor, many have looked to Talmudic sources critical of those who
assisted the Romans in the apprehension ofJewish defendants.3"
However, a number of scholars have found the Talmudic discussion inapplicable in the context of the American legal system,
emphasizing fundamental distinctions between the conditions in
contemporary American law and society and those existent in the
times of Roman and other oppressive and tyrannical governments." Therefore, consistent with the principle in Jewish law
respecting the inherent authority of a just legal system,32 many
have concluded that, under most circumstances, there is no pro25. See MEIR TAmAvi, WITH ALL YOUR POSSESSIONS: JEWISH ETHICS AND
ECONOMIC LIFE 159-208 (1987); see also BROYDE, supra note 2, at 115-22.
26.

See TAMARi, supra note 25, at 183-90; see also AARON

ICS AND JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES

LEVINE, ECONOM-

185-213 (1987).

27. See Biser, supra note 6, at 121-22.
28. See id. at 120-21. But see BROYDE, supra note 2, at 53-66, 115-22.
29. See Biser, supra note 6, at 121. But see BROYDE, supra note 2, at 121
(concluding that contemporary lawyers generally do not violate the primary
substantive prohibition even when facilitating a transaction involving interest).
30. See TALMUD BAVLI, Baba Metzia 83b-84a. Over the years, codes ofJewish law have often prohibited facilitating the arrest and prosecution of Jewish
criminal defendants in a secular legal system. See Biser, supra note 6, at 125
(citing sources); Michael J. Broyde, Informing on Others for Violating American
Law: A Jewish Law View, 43 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. Soc'y 5, 5-14 (2002).

31. See Biser, supra note 6, at 126-27.
32. SeeJ. David Bleich, Jewish Law and the State's Authority to Punish Crime,
12 CARDozo L. REV. 829 (1991); Aaron Kirschenbaum & Jon Trafimow, The
Sovereign Power of the State: A Proposed Theory of Accommodation in Jewish Law, 12
CARDozo

L. REV. 925 (1991); Aaron Rakefet-Rothkoff, Dina D'MalkhutaDina-

The Law of the Land in Halakhic Perspective, 13 TRADITION 5 (1972); Hershel
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hibition against assisting the American government in appropriate prosecution of Jewish criminal defendants.3"
Likewise, attitudes under Jewish law toward the practice of
criminal defense may depend on the implications and application of yet another Talmudic passage. The Talmud recounts an
episode in which a rabbi was approached by individuals who were
rumored to have committed a homicide and were attempting to
remain in hiding. 4 After some deliberation, the rabbi decided
neither to assist them in hiding nor to expose them to their pursuers, but instead instructed them to hide by themselves.3"
Although a number of aspects of both the facts of the case and
the rabbi's analysis are open to interpretation, 6 some commentators understand the rabbi's decision not to assist the apparent
fugitives as consistent with the Biblical command to "eradicate
evil from your midst."3 7 Based on this explanation, some authorities ofJewish law have found that the work of a criminal defense
attorney, generally requiring representation of defendants who
have, in fact, committed crimes,3" would likely violate the command. 9 Yet again, however, others have suggested that such
concerns would not pertain to the American criminal justice system, in which the legal system sanctions-and mandates-the
function of the criminal defense attorney, not as a means of subvertingjustice, but as integral to insure the fairness of the process
through which guilty criminals are convicted and punished.4"
In addition to substantive challenges the practice of law may
pose to the observance of various areas of Jewish religious obligation, a number of tactics typically employed by and expected of
lawyers likewise seem to conflict with legal and ethical teachings
in Jewish tradition. For example, the lawyer's duty to advocate
Schachter, "DinaDe'malchusa Dina": Secular Law as a Religious Obligation, 1 J.
HAt.Ac- A & CoNTEMP. Soc'v 103 (1981).
33. See BROYDE, supra note 2, at 83-88; Biser, supra note 6, at 126-27;

Broyde supra note 30 passim; Schachter, supra note 32, at 117-19.
34. See TALMUD BAVLI, Niddah 61a.
35.
36.

See id.
See BROYDE, supra note 2, at 91-94; Schachter, supra note 32, at

120-21.
37.
38.

Deuteronomy 19:19. See Schachter, supra note 32, at 121.
See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE XiV (1982) (stating

that "the vast majority of criminal defendants are [factually] guilty of the crimes
with which they are charged.").
39. See Biser, supra note 6, at 128; Schachter, supra note 32, at 121-22.
40. See BROYDE, supra note 2, at 94-96. In the words of Lon Fuller, our
criminal justice system "aims at keeping sound and wholesome the procedures
by which society visits its condemnation on an erring member." Lon L. Fuller,
The Adversary System, in TALKs ON AMERICAN LAw 35 (Harold J. Berman ed.,
1961).
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the position of the client includes advancing arguments that,
although not frivolous, may not comport with the lawyer's own
factual or legal assessment.4 Likewise, commercial and transactional lawyers, among others, may find themselves involved in a
difficult bargaining process that calls for tough and unpleasant, if
not morally questionable, negotiation tactics.4 2 In the courtroom, lawyers may have to resort to unpleasant and even insulting or embarrassing treatment of opposing witnesses. Perhaps
most significantly, the prevailing basic norm of lawyering
requires zealous representation of a client's interests, often
understood to include the general absence of any consideration
of the consequences to others.4 4
Thus, the practice of law in the American adversary system
of justice may entail tactics that involve elements of intellectual
dishonesty, decidedly hostile behavior toward others, and a general disregard for the interests of anyone but the client. Such
tactics seem not only in potential conflict with substantive aspects
of Jewish law, but also, on some level, fundamentally incompatible with basic Jewish ethical tenets and teachings.4 5 Indeed, concerns over the nature of these and other adversarial tactics have
motivated efforts among leading American ethics scholars to
41. Indeed, a criminal defense attorney and, according to some, an attorney in a civil case, may-and arguably should-cross-examine a truthful adversarial witness in a manner designed to discredit the witness in the eyes of the
jury, and may rely on truthful evidence to persuade the jury of an inference the
lawyer knows is false. See SamuelJ. Levine, The Yale L. Rosenberg Memorial Lecture:
Taking ProsecutorialEthics Seriously: A Considerationof the Prosecutor'sEthical Obligation to "Seek Justice" in a ComparativeAnalytical Framework, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1337,

1344-46 & nn.19-27 (2004).
42. See, e.g., Geoffrey M. Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1 (1987); Alvin Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers'Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L.
REv. 577 (1975); Gerald Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 IowA L.
REv. 1219 (1990); see also BROYDE, supra note 2, at 123-25; Steven H. Resnicoff,
Lying and Lawyering: ContrastingAmerican andJewish Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
937 (2002); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Lyingfor Clients, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 195
(1996).
43. See, e.g., GILLERS, supra note 8, at 367-71 (describing the debate over
the tactics of Max Steuer's cross-examination of truthful witnesses in the criminal trial connected with the Triangle Shirtwaist Company fire).
44.

See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980) ("A lawyer

should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."); MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt (2002) ("A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy
upon the client's behalf."); see also FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 8, at 71-127.
45. See Biser, supra note 6, at 129-35; Greisman, supra note 20, at
2420-26; Resnicoff, supra note 20, at 96-104. See also Rabbi Menachem Mendel
Blachman, The Sacrifice of Intellectual Honesty, http://www.kby.org/torah/
article.cfm?articleid=1263.
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reassess, rethink, and even reformulate the ethical obligations of
American lawyers. 4 6
In short, even a brief survey of substantive and tactical
aspects of legal practice demonstrates a number of issues of
potential conflict between the lawyer's professional obligations
and the requirements of Jewish law. As presented here, these
issues are intended to illustrate some of the considerations
involved in analyzing the American practice of law under Jewish
legal tradition. Resolution of these issues requires a thorough
and accurate understanding of both Jewish law and the complexities of American law and lawyering on their own terms, coupled
with the ability to then determine the relationship between
them.
B.

Broader Aspects of Legal Practice: Utilization of Resources
and Abilities

Beyond technical aspects, both substantive and tactical, of
the practice of law, a consideration of legal practice through a
perspective of Jewish tradition might look to the manner in
which lawyers utilize their resources and abilities. Drawing upon
the example of sanctifying the physical and mundane by providing food for those in need,4 7 in accordance with the imperative
of charity4 8 lawyers may find virtue in providing specialized assistance to those for whom it might otherwise remain unavailable,
46. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF
LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998); David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD
LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 83 (David Luban ed., 1983);
Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 885 (1996); Robert W. Gordon, CorporateLaw Practiceas
a Public Calling,49 MD. L. REv. 255 (1990); Russell G. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0:
Lawyers are Morally Accountable, 70 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1805 (2002); Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in ProfessionalEthics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalismand Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REv.
669 (1978); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic,
41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988); Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52
OHIO ST. L.J. 551 (1991); Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics, 80 IOWA L. REv. 901 (1995); W. Bradley
Wendel, Public Values and ProfessionalResponsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1
(1999); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, ReconceptualizingAdvocacy Ethics, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (2005); Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and
Client Interest, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1303 (1995). See generally Samuel J.
Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously: Ethical Deliberation as Ethical Obligation,
37 IND. L. REv. 21 (2003).
47. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., MAIMONIDES, supra note 5, Laws of Matanoth Aniim, ch. 10;
TAMAw, supra note 25, at 248-62; see also JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, YEMEI
ZICHARON

43-45 (1996).
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in the form of pro bono representation. 9 Moreover, in spite of
the aversion toward professional advocacy in the Jewish legal system,5" the Biblical verse, "[o]pen your mouth for those who are
mute . . . open your mouth, judge righteously, and plead the

cause of those who are poor and needy,"'" indicates that Jewish
law requires adequate presentation of the claims of parties unable to represent themselves. 5 2 Thus, to the extent that Jewish
thought would generally approve of the practice of law in the
American adversary system of justice,5 3 it would seem that protecting the rights of the needy may qualify as a particularly appropriate form of advocacy. 54
On a broader level, Jewish tradition emphasizes the duty,
incumbent upon both individuals and society, to insure justice,
with special care for those who are downtrodden and disadvantaged.5 5 Indeed, the Jewish nation originated in the figure of
Abraham, whose arguments in behalf of the people of Sodom
49. See, e.g., Steven Lubet & Cathryn Stewart, A "Public Assets" Theory of
Lawyers'ProBono Obligations, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1245 (1997); Deborah L. Rhode,
Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law Students, 67 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2415 (1999).
50. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
51. Proverbs 31:8-9. See also YECHIEL HILLEL ALTSCHULLER, METZUDATH
DOVID (commenting on Proverbs 31:8-9).

52. SeeJOSEPH KARO, KESEF MISHNE (commenting on MAIMONIDES, supra
note 5, Laws of Sanhedrin 21:11); JOSEPH KARo, SHULCHAN ARUCH Choshen
Mishpat 17:9; MAIMONIDES, supranote 5, Laws of Sanhedrin 21:11; see also TALMUD
YERUSHALMI, Sanhedrin 3:8, cited in HERRING, supra note 5, at 96; BROYDE, supra
note 2, at 13, 21-22; HERRING, supra note 5, at 102-06; RABBI SHLOMO BEN
ADRET, TESHUVOTH HA-RASHBA 2:393, cited in BROYDE, supra note 2, at 21.
53.

See supra Part II.A.

54.

See

DEBORAH

L.

RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE

(2004); 2004 Symposium

Transcript: Access to Justice: Does it Exist in Civil Cases?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
455 (2004); Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Persons: Professional and Ethical Issues, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1713 (1999); Colloquium, Deborah
L. Rhode's Access toJustice, 73 FoRDHAM L. REV. 841 (2004); Deborah L. Rhode,
Access to Justice, 69 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1785 (2001); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to
Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369 (2004).
55. See SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 10, at 91 (describing the attributes of the
leader who "takes up [a] stand in the midst of the concrete world, [with] feet
planted firmly on the ground of reality, and [ ] looks about and sees, listens and
hears, and publicly protests against the oppression of the helpless, the
defrauding of the poor, and the plight of the orphan"); see also id. (quoting the
renowned scholar and communal leader, Rabbi Chaim of Brisk, stating that the
"function of a rabbi" is primarily "[t]o redress the grievances of those who are
abandoned and alone, to protect the dignity of the poor, and to save the
oppressed from the hands of [the] oppressor," more so than to provide "ritual
decisions" or "political leadership"); TAMAm, supra note 25, at 242-77.
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and Gomorrah stand as a model of advocacy for justice. "6 Likewise, the imperative of striving to achieve social justice and fairness, with an eye toward mercy and compassion for those in
society who are less fortunate, continues throughout sources of
Jewish law and ethics, in the form of legal precepts, dramatic narrative, and hortatory exhortation. 5 7 Thus, it is not uncommon
for American lawyers working for social justice to see themselves
as following the powerful teachings, if not the religious traditions, of the Biblical prophets.5" In fact, these traditions might
suggest that, in light of the measure of power and influence lawyers often attain in both public and private arenas, the practice
of law carries a corresponding obligation of counseling disenfranchised clients59 and working to protect their rights and
interests.6 °
56.
DAVAR,

See Genesis 18:20-33; see also RABBI NAFATALI Tzvi BERLIN, HA'EMEK
Introduction to Commentary on Genesis (Yeshivat Volojine ed. 1999); 2

ELIvAHU DESSLER, MICHTAV M'ELIYAHU 181-82 (Aryeh Carmell & Chaim Fried-

lander eds., 1963).
57. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Halacha and Aggada: TranslatingRobert
Cover's Nomos and Narrative, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 465, 497-98 (quoting Psalms
68:5-6; MAIMONIDES, CODE OF LAW, at Laws of Estates 11:12); see also TAMARI,
supra note 25, at 242-77.
58. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, RABBIS AND LAwYERs: THE JOURNEY FROM
TORAH TO CONSTITUTION passim (1990); Thomas L. Shaffer, The BiblicalProphets
as Lawyers for the Poor, 31 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 15 (2003); Thomas L. Shaffer,
Lawyers and the Biblical Prophets, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 521
(2003); Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyers as Prophets, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 469
(2003); see also Ronald R. Garet, Judges as Prophets:A Coverian Interpretation,72 S.

L. REV. 385 (1999).
59. See, e.g., FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 8, at 6-9, 49-55; THOMAS L.
SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILrrY (1994); WOLFRAM, supranote 8, at 76-78; Edward Dauer & Arthur Leff, Correspondence, The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573 (1977); Charles Fried, The
CAL.

Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundationsof the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.

1060 (1976).
60. For perspectives of contemporary American legal ethics scholars
applying many of these concepts to the work ofJewish lawyers advocating social
justice, see, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics from a Jewish Perspective, 27
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1131 (1996); Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer:
Reflections on the Construction of Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577,
1578-79 (1993); Russell G. Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a Multicultural Society: A
Midrash on Levinson, 14 CARDozo L. REV. 1613, 1635-36 (1993); Russell G.
Pearce, The Jewish Lawyer's Question, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1259 (1996); Nancy B.
Rapoport, Living "Top-Down" in a "Bottom-Up" World: Musings on the Relationship
Between Jewish Ethics and Legal Ethics, 78 NEB. L. REV. 18 (1999); Abbe Smith &
William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50 MERCER L. REV. 443, 451
(1999); see also Levine, Broad Life, supra note 9; Levine, Practiceof Law as a Religious Calling, supra note 9.

For a thoughtful recent contribution to this literature, see Amy Porter, Representing the Reprehensible and Identity Conflicts in Legal Representation, 14 TEMP.
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Conduct Incidental the Practice of Law

C.

Finally, Jewish tradition addresses more generally the manner in which individuals conduct themselves in all of their daily
activities. Thus, for example, in addition to observance of dietary
laws and sharing food with those in need, the mundane act of
taking part in a meal can be transformed into a noble pursuit in
which participants infuse their meal with spiritual study, thus eating at the "table of God."61 Likewise, building on the Biblical
verse that commands "in all of your ways acknowledge [God] ,"62
Jewish thought has emphasized that all of life's endeavors, viewed
and undertaken in proper perspective, have the potential to be
performed in a way that constitutes serving God.6 3
Among various occupations, the practice of law may present
some of the most formidable challenges to and, conversely, some
of the most promising opportunities for acknowledging God in
all of one's ways. 64 Legal practice increasingly demands a disproportionate degree of the lawyer's time and energy, dominating
both the intellect and the emotions amidst an often pressured
and combative atmosphere. Under such circumstances, the lawyer may find it difficult to maintain an appropriate level of
respectful behavior toward others, including clients, co-workers,
and professional adversaries. Of course, by nature, legal representation and advocacy usually require a degree of argumentation and confrontation.6 5 Nevertheless, to the extent that
common courtesies and basic morals sometimes seem trivial in
POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 143 (2004). Cf THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHISTIAN AND

A LAWYER

35-104 (1981); Conference, Lawyers, Religious Faith, and

SocialJustice: Our Responsibility to "the Orphan, the Widow, the Alien" and "the Least of
These, "Pepperdine University School of Law (Feb. 4-5, 2005); Thomas L. Shaffer, Should a Christian Lawyer Serve the Guilty?, 23 GA. L. REV. 1021 (1989).

61.

TALMUD,

Avoth 3:3.

62. Proverbs 3:6.
63. See Levine, Practiceof Law as a Religious Calling, supra note 9, at 412-13
& nn.3-6 (citing sources).
64. For more general applications of the principle of serving God
through proper conduct in the workplace, see RABBI REUVEN ZIEGLER, By His
LIGHT: CHARACTER AND VALUES IN THE SERVICE OF GOD, BASED ON ADDRESSES BY
RABBI AHARON LICHTENSTEIN

1-74 (2003); Yitzchok A. Breitowitz, The Spiritual

Challenges of the Workplace, 62 JEWISH ACTION 18 (2002); David Hojda, Personal
and FinancialIntegrity and Halachah, 66JEWISH ACTION 32 (2005) (reviewing several recently published books relevant to these issues); Levine, Practiceof Law as
a Religious Calling,supra note 9, at 414-15 & nn.11-20 (citing sources); see also
HOWARD GARDNER ET AL., GOOD WORK: WHEN EXCELLENCE AND ETHICS MEET

(2001).
65. For different views on the appropriate degree of confrontational
behavior in practicing law, compare, e.g., FinalReport of the Committee on Civility
of the Seventh FederalJudicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 441 (1992), with Amy R. Mash-
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such an atmosphere,6 6 Jewish law and ethics may provide lawyers
a particularly valuable perspective, serving as a reminder of the
imperative to serve God and morality in all of life's activities.
CONCLUSION

As Rabbi Soloveitchik has eloquently explained, Jewish
thought "does not differentiate between the [person] who stands
in [the] house of worship, engaged in ritual activities, and the
mortal who must wage the arduous battle of life." 67 Jewish tradition "rejects such a personality split, such a spiritual schizophrenia[,]" 6' 8 instead "declar[ing] that [a person] stands before God
not only in the synagogue but also in the public domain, in
[one's] house, while on a journey, while lying down and rising
up."6 9 In short, "[t]he marketplace, the street, the factory, the
house, the meeting place, the banquet hall, all constitute the
backdrop for the religious life.",70 Thus, Jewish law and ethics
address and provide a conceptual framework for spiritual enrichburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U.
L. REv. 657 (1994); see also FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 8, at 123-27.

66. See, e.g., Robert S. Caine, Letter, A Lawyer's View of Being a Litigant,
N.Y.L.J., May 16, 1994, at 2, cited in GILLERS, supra note 8, at 68:
As a litigant, you're often subjected to indignities and lack of consideration by lawyers and judges.
There's something wrong with us lawyers-and judges, toowhen we can't realize the harm we're doing to our clients and to the
public, the heartache and frustration and pain we cause to others
because we fail to attend civilly and prompdy to the needs of others
for communication.
Id.; see also Steven G. Gey, A Tribute to Steve Goldstein: Introduction:It Just Isn't Fair,

22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 799, 800 (1995) ("We lawyers are many fine things, but we
are usually not very good at impersonating human beings. We are often a cold
and competitive lot, and our time is far too precious to squander it on the
common decencies of ordinary human interaction."); Thomas L. Shaffer, Towering Figures, Enigmas, and Responsive Communities in American Legal Ethics, 51 ME.
L. REv. 229, 239 (1999) (advising graduating law students "not to forget the
morals they brought to law school, not to let law professors dissuade them from
what they had learned from their mothers and their towns, from their religious
formation and from their friends and teachers in college"). For a similar critique of doctors, see Barron H. Lerner, Practicing Medicine Without a Swagger,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2005, at F6 (describing "some physicians [who] became
vain and arrogant, making extraordinary demands and openly misbehaving,"
including "certain surgeons who ran operating rooms like fiefs, screaming at
staff members and even throwing surgical instruments to signify their
discontent").
67. SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 10, at 93.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 94.
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ment in all facets of human behavior, from overtly religious settings to the workplace to leisurely activities. 71 In some ways,
therefore, from a perspective of Jewish tradition, American practice of law constitutes but another area of activity, to be analyzed
and sanctified in accordance with its intrinsic challenges to and
opportunities for religious observance and spirituality.
Notably, in recent years there has developed a wide perception of crisis in the work of lawyers, 72 representative of the kind
71. Indeed, the imperative to behave properly applies as much on a basketball court as in a court of law. Thus, consistent with the three-tiered conceptual framework that illustrates different ways legal practice may accord with
Jewish law and ethics, various aspects of engaging in sports may provide both
challenges to and opportunities for serving God. For example, on a technical
level, in adherence to Jewish religious observance, an individual may not participate in sports activities on the Sabbath or a Holy Day. See, e.g., Ira Berkow,
When Basketball is a Matter of Faith: A Budding Star Balances His Game and His
Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2000, at DI (describing student who accepted
offer to play on basketball team at a Division I college, emphasizing that he
would not play on the Sabbath); Murray Chass, On Yom Kippur, Green Opts to
Miss at Least One Game, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004 (describing baseball player
Shawn Green's decision not to play on Yom Kippur during the 1994 pennant
race); Levinson, supra note 60, at 1579-81 (describing Sandy Koufax's decision
not to pitch on Yom Kippur, including the first game of the 1965 World Series,
and Hank Greenberg's decision not to play on Yom Kippur during the 1934
pennant race); Alan Schwarz, In the Spirit of Koufax, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001
(describing Shawn Green's decision not to play on Yom Kippur during the 1991
pennant race).
On a broader level, athletes might dedicate some of the money and fame
they have earned for the benefit of noble causes such as assisting those in need.
Finally, perhaps most instructive for a consideration of the practice of law,
athletes may demonstrate moral character in the way they conduct themselves
in the midst of competitive play. See Berkow, supra, at D4 (quoting student's
observation that "Torah and basketball go hand in hand for me. Torah makes
me a better basketball player because it emphasizes good character, integrity
and responsibility. You have to be on time, respect others and work hard.");
ZIEGLER, supra note 64, at 42-43:
[T]he world of sports is, in a certain sense, trivial; mature adults are
running around trying to put a ball through a hole. Nevertheless,
moral qualities can and do come into play: cooperation, team [ ] play,
an attempt to get the maximum out of yourself, etc. The inherent
effort of the person . . .or the loneliness of the long-distance runner
in ... isolation, are very significant moral elements .... [T]here is no

question that within the essentially trivial world of sports, real moral
greatness and real moral degradation can be seen. If you see someone
on the basketball court who wants only to shoot and score, and
defense means nothing to [the player], this is not simply disturbing to
another basketball player, but is morally repugnant.
72. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS
IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY

T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS
(1993); SOL M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE

(1994);

ANTHONY

OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWY-
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of "deep fissure in one's psychic identity" described by Rabbi
Soloveitchik. 73 Numerous theories have been offered to identify
both causes and symptoms of dispirit and discontent among lawyers,7 4 followed by the establishment of various movements and
proposals in response.7 5 One of the most promising responses
has resulted in the emergence of a religious lawyering movement,76 dedicated to examining and demonstrating the relevance of religious values to the practice of law.7 7 Ultimately,
then, from a perspective of American legal practice, Jewish legal
and ethical teachings present a model for a consideration of the
way religious traditions and other value systems may inform and
help improve exploration of and attitudes toward the work and
ethics of lawyers.7 8

ERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994); see also sources cited

supra note 12.

73.

SOLOVEITCHIK,

supra note 10, at 93; see also Samuel J. Levine, Introduc-

tory Note: Symposium on Lawyering and Personal Values: Responding to the Problems of
Ethical Schizophrenia, 38 CATH. LAW. 145 (1998); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Living
One Way in Town and Another Way at Home, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 879 (1997).
74. See supra note 72.
75. See, e.g., FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 8, at 122-27; GILLERS, supra
note 8, at 9-13; Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REv. 259 (1995); Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism, supra note
12; Pearce, The ProfessionalParadigm Shift, supra note 12.
76. See, e.g., Howard Lesnick, Riding the Second Wave of the So-Called Religious Lawyering Movement, 75 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 283 (2001); Russell G. Pearce,
Foreword: The Religious Lawyering Movement: An Emerging Force in Legal Ethics and
Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998); Russell G. Pearce & AmeliaJ.
Uelmen, William A. Brahms Lecture on Law and Religion: Religious Lawyering in a
Liberal Democracy: A Challenge and an Invitation, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 127
(2004); Robert K. Vischer, Heretics in the Temple of Law: The Promiseand Perilof the
Religious Lawyering Movement, 19 J. L. & RELIGION 427 (2003-04).
77. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Introduction: Can the OrdinaryPracticeof
Law be a Religious Calling?, 32 PEPP. L. REv. 373 (2005); Rose Kent, What's Faith
Got to Do With It?, 6 FORDHAM LAW. 11 (Summer 2001) (describing Fordham
University School of Law's Institute on Religion, Law & Lawyer's Work); Symposium, Faith and the Law, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 925 (1996); Symposium, Lawyering
and Personal Values, 38 CATH. LAw. 145 (1998); Symposium, Rediscoveringthe Role
of Religion in the Lives of Lawyers and Those They Represent, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
821 (1999); Symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: An Interfaith
Conference, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998); see also The Institute on Law, Religion, and Ethics, http://law.pepperdine.edu/ilre/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
78. Cf GARDNER ET AL., supra note 64, at 248:
You-like the rest of us-will find it very difficult to stay on course
unless you feel loyal to an enduring tradition. Sometimes your loyalty
or trust may be based on religious faith ....
Without strong foundations in traditions that give meaning to the future, it is hard to keep up
professional values under the pressure of countervailing forces. And
so, as often as needed, unclutter your mind: Revisit those codes, docu-
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ments, and exemplars that are integral to your domain-whether they
are as ancient as the words of Moses, Hammurabi, or Hippocrates, or
as recent as the mission statement of your favorite organization.
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